ARKANSAS NUCLEAR ONE - NRC INTEGRATED INSPECTION
by Bob Meyer
These findings and NRC report indicate latent errors and lack of engagment to adequately assess and correct issues.
In a letter dated February 11, 2010 to Kevin Walsch, VP Operations, Entergy, the NRC stated the four NRC violations were noted and one self-revealing finding identified.
1. Inadequate corrective actions. The inspectors documented a self-revealing finding for the licensee’s failure to implement timely corrective action for industry operating experience associated with intake water blockage and for failure to implement effective corrective action stemming from a very similar event in 2006 where Unit 1 was forced to decrease reactor power due to an unexpected Shad run.
2. Failure to follow procedures. The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, “Instruction, Procedures, and Drawing,” regarding the licensee’s failure to follow the requirements of Procedure EN-OP-104, “Operability Determination Process,” Revision 4. Specifically, on October 15, 2009, following removal of a seismic restraint from the Train B Containment Spray Valve 2CV-5672-1 for preventive maintenance purposes, the inspectors identified that the shift manager approved and documented an operability determination using a cancelled engineering change document.
3. Failure to correct a condition adverse to quality - removal of rigid seismic restraint for valve 2CV-5672-1, containment spray pump 2P-35B minimum recirculation valve, in the support of motor-operated valve actuator maintenance with an invalid engineering change to support the containment spray system's seismic operability licensing basis. This condition should have caused Unit 2 to enter Technical Specification 3.0.3 for 31 minutes on October 15, 2009.
4. Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.73, “Licensee Event Report System,” associated with the licensee’s failure to submit a licensee event report within 60 days following discovery of an event meeting the reportability criteria as specified. Specifically, on September 22, 2009, the licensee completed their analysis of an issue associated with degradation of the latching mechanism of a station high energy line break door. The licensee determined that an unanalyzed condition may have existed for the period that the door was unlatched.
5. Severity Level IV. The inspectors identified a noncited violation of 10 CFR 50.72, “Immediate Notification Requirements for Operating Nuclear Power Reactors,” for the licensee’s failure to notify the NRC Operations Center within 8 hours following discovery of an event meeting the reportability criteria as specified. Specifically, on September 22, 2009, the licensee initiated a 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) 8-hour nonemergency report at 12:46 p.m. CST to the NRC Operations Center based on an event time of 5:11 a.m. Operations staff notified the resident inspectors of the 8-hour event notification to the NRC Operations Center later that afternoon. The inspectors questioned whether the timing of the NRC notification met the requirements of the applicable regulation. The inspectors determined that the initial loss of power to the emergency offsite facility occurred at approximately 10:40 p.m. on September 21, 2009, the emergency offsite facility diesel generator K8 started but failed to supply power to the facility, and this was reported to the control room at 11:45 p.m. on September 21, 2009. Normal power was restored at 4:20 a.m. Due to the time that the emergency offsite facility was degraded, this was considered a major loss of assessment, communications, and response capability, and the licensee initiated a 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) 8-hour nonemergency report, but not within the 8-hour reporting period of the discovery.
